In cheque dishonour case, first notice will constitute cause of action if second notice was given beyond limitation

 In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a
legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt
of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement
stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement
that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or
payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not
as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on
him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that
despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice  was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice
dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso
(b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the
memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31
December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section
138.
11 The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a
complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action
has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however
stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the
prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for
not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to
institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above.
The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the
period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint
are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for
seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint.
We are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay
in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first

legal notice dated 31 December 2015.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 000868 OF 2019

Birendra Prasad Sah Vs The State of Bihar 

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
Dated:May 8, 2019.