Supreme court judgment on right to speedy trial in criminal prosecution

In view of the above discussion, the following
propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must
forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is
difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down
any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:

(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21
of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The
fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves
the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of
the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or
innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in
the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this
Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a
restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from
the point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention
should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused
should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long
incarceration prior to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his
vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged
investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability
of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of
death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or
otherwise.
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is
usually the accused who is interested in delaying the
proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence
tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the
prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of
evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the
prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the
prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings.
Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is
alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and
answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings
taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and

interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying

tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be
counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous
proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day
of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good
faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and
an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof
that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are
obtained on ex parte representation.
(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have
regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of
offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the
court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on — what
is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation
of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary
as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted
in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the
accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As
has been observed by Powell, J. in Barke 33 L Ed 2d 101 “it
cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where
justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea
has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell 15 L Ed 2d 627 in
the following words:
‘... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is
necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly
expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients;
and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an
unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the
circumstances.’
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as
presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of
incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The
prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But
when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends
upon the facts of a given case.
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the
‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the

court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused’s plea
of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the
accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case,
he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it
would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for
a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA,
the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered
down in Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the
several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing
process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to
speedy trial has been denied in a given case.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1912 OF 2015

AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY  Vs.  UNION OF INDIA 

Dated;February 16, 2015